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First impressions in familiar eyewitness identifications improve accuracy in target absent 
lineups 
Katelynn Mary Carter-Rogers 
Abstract 
There is evidence in the literature suggesting first impressions, though resilient, can be 
swayed by additional information (Baker, ten Brinke, & Porter, 2013). The purpose of 
this research is to investigate whether first impressions influence decisions when the 
target is familiar to the eyewitness, when utilizing a target-absent identification line-up. 
Results showed that participants in familiar conditions who received information had 
higher accuracy rates in comparison to individuals who received no information when 
making a decision. It was also found that confidence significantly fell in familiar 
conditions when the participant misidentified. Implications suggest the first impressions 
the eyewitness has does not impact the accuracy outcomes, but rather any past knowledge 
about the familiar individual may improve target-absent lineup accuracy. There may be 
some flexibility when it comes to confidence ratings, seeing a decline in a confidence 
rating, may allow investigators to assess accuracy in a familiar suspect situation.  
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First impressions in familiar eyewitness identifications improve accuracy in target absent 
lineups 
 
On December 22, 1981, in Winnipeg, Manitoba, a young couple traveled to their 
favorite coffee shop, only to find it unexpectedly empty. As they approached the shop, a 
man wearing a cowboy hat exited. He pushed them aside and mumbled that the shop was 
closed. The young couple suspected that something was wrong. The young man went 
inside where he found a female clerk dead on the floor. He immediately rushed after the 
man who just left the shop and confronted him. Upon doing so, the suspect pulled a knife, 
giving him the opportunity to escape. It was at this moment the young couple called the 
police (Myers & Smith, 2015).  
Thomas Sophonow was travelling from Vancouver to Winnipeg with the 
expectation that he would be visiting his two-year-old daughter. While visiting the city, 
he went Christmas shopping at several stores in the area. (Harland-Logan, 2015). During 
the investigation of the coffee shop murder, the police received information that put Tom 
near the coffee shop earlier that day. The police ask Tom if he would consent to having 
his photo taken for a lineup, and since Tom felt he had nothing to hide, he agreed. He 
even wore his cowboy hat, as requested by the police. The young man that witnessed the 
suspect leaving the coffee shop the night of the murder was unable to identify Tom from 
the photo lineup. However, he later saw Tom talking to the police and remarked that he 
was 90% sure Tom was the suspect from the coffee shop. Tom was then asked by police 
to participate in a live lineup. Again, feeling he had nothing to hide, Tom consented.  
This time the young man positively identified Tom as the murderer. Tom Sophonow 
spent 4 years in prison before he was acquitted for a crime he did not commit (Myers & 
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Smith, 2015). Tom’s story is an example to how previous exposure can lead to errors in 
an eyewitness line-up, especially when the actual suspect is not present in that line-up. 
This experiment addresses how the controversial practice of familiar identification from a 
target-absent line-up can be improved upon using additional information, and judgments 
made from exposure to ones face.  
Most have heard the old saying “don’t judge a book by its cover”, and yet every 
day after meeting someone new, we form an opinion about them. After being introduced 
to someone, we may hear remarks regarding their personality, achievements, and actions. 
From these conversations people create their own perception of these now new 
acquaintances. Current research in first impressions suggests that these initial meetings 
factor into many of our decisions in social situations including: mate selection, jury 
decision making, and hiring (Gilron & Gutches, 2012; Korva, Porter, O’Connor, Shaw, & 
ten Brinke, 2012; Langlois et al., 2000; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Porter, ten Brinke, 
& Gustaw, 2010; Varghese, Hardin, Bauer, & Morgan, 2010).  Within the literature in 
facial recognition it is discussed that previous exposure to a face influences our 
judgments and initial reactions through the snap judgment process (Günaydin, Zayas, 
Selcuk, & Hazan, 2012; Rule, Freeman, Moran, Gabriele, Adams, & Ambady, 2010). 
The initial exposures to the face correctly predicted outcomes of congressional elections 
in the United States, where judgments of candidates’ facial appearance predicted the 
election success (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005).   
The Dangerous Decision Theory (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009) offers a model 
outlining the psychological processes involved in arriving at these initial judgments, 
particularly pertaining to the evaluation of trustworthiness. This theory suggests that an 
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individual’s first impression of a stranger’s face produces an instant evaluation of trust 
that affects judgments of subsequent information relevant to that stranger. That is, when 
we are meeting someone for the very first time, we instantaneously form a perception of 
trust.  
After we have been exposed to an individual and become “familiar” with them 
(this sense of familiarity may come from the additional information we have learned 
about them), it is a fair statement to say that we feel confident that we could recognize 
this person again if seeing them in the future (Memon, Hope, & Bull, 2003). 
Unfortunately, this confidence is tested during eyewitness identification cases where past 
research suggests that more exposure time to familiar faces leads to misidentification due 
to overconfidence, particularly in target-absent lineups (i.e., where the perpetrator is not 
present in the lineup; Kerstholt, Raaijmakers, & Valeton, 1992; Read, Vokey, & 
Hammersley, 1990).  
In the field of eyewitness identification, familiarity leads to many false 
identifications when the target is absent from the line-up, suggesting that familiar 
eyewitnesses are potentially hazardous to the identification procedure (Read, 1995). On 
the other hand, facial recognition research suggests that initial first impressions are 
accurate when making social decisions. Arguably, these first impressions may not be 
accurate to the individual per se (ten Brinke & Porter, 2011), but the way that an 
individual perceives credibility and trustworthiness helps them form concrete decisions, 
whether these decisions occur in courtrooms, in voting, or in hiring decisions. The 
purpose of the present study is to determine if first impressions also have an impact on 
the accuracy of eyewitness identification after a judgment is passed. By introducing first 
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impressions to eyewitness identification, it will be tested if first impressions regarding 
familiar eyewitness identifications influence eyewitness accuracy in target-absent line-
ups.  
Eyewitness research 
There is extensive research on eyewitness lineup procedure and identification 
(Brewer, & Wells, 2006; Dobolyi, & Dodson, 2013; Douglass, Neuschatz, Imrich, & 
Wilkinson, 2010; Fitzgerald, Price, Oriet, & Charman, 2013; Flowe, Mehta, & Ebbesen, 
2011; Horry, Palmer, & Brewer, 2012; Memon, et al., 2003; Molinaro, Arndorfer, & 
Charman, 2013; Odinot, Wolters, & van Giezen, 2013; Steblay, Trix, Benson, 2013; 
Zarkadi, Wade, & Stewart, 2009). Although research in eyewitness identification is broad 
ranging, it is important, in the context of this research, to understand a few core findings. 
In addition, several relevant procedures will be described. 
The use of target-present versus target-absent lineups is common when 
determining eyewitness accuracy. In this literature, the “target” is the suspect in the 
crime. In many cases when police officers show an eyewitness a line-up including an 
apprehended suspect, it is important to address that the suspect may not be the actual 
criminal, i.e., the person being presented is a suspect, but not the actual perpetrator 
(Wells & Olson, 2003). Eyewitnesses who can identify an individual from a target-
present line-up, i.e., a correct identification, may also mistakenly identify an innocent 
individual from a target-absent line-up, i.e., a false identification (Wells, 1984). The 
target-absent line-up has repeatedly caused issues for eyewitnesses where they have not 
been able to make accurate identifications (Brewer, & Wells, 2006; Horry, et al, 2012; 
Jackiw, Arbuthnott, Pfeifer, Marcon, & Meisssner, 2008; Lindsay, 1986; Lindsay, 
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Pozzulo, Craig, Lee, & Corber, 1997; Lindsay, Ross, Smith, & Flanigan, 1999; Parker, & 
Carranza, 1989; Smith, Stinson, & Prosser, 2004; Zajac, & Karageorge, 2009). A study 
conducted by Zajac, and Henderson (2009) identified how eyewitnesses, who had 
incorrect information about a perpetrator’s eye colour, were twice as likely to identify an 
innocent person from a target-absent line-up in comparison to people who did not receive 
the information.  This chart was created to elaborate how the target-present lineup 
and target-absent lineup works (See figure 1). Certain outcomes are expected depending 
on what type of line-up the eyewitness is presented with. These outcomes are pertinent to 
the decision the eyewitness makes. In a target-present line-up, an eyewitness who 
chooses the suspect from the line-up has made a correct identification. This is the best 
outcome within the target-present line-up because the true perpetrator of the crime was 
correctly identified. The other option within the target-present line-up is not choosing the 
suspect, and identifying a foil, or rejecting the line-up. This eyewitness is described as a 
bad witness, as they are unable to make the correct decision. In a target-present line-up, 
these two options are not detrimental to an innocent person for two reason. First, if a 
correct identification is made, the criminal will go to jail. Second, if they do not choose 
the suspect, and choose a foil (which is a known innocent) or reject the line-up, no 
innocent person will be sent to jail, and the eyewitness will be dismissed. However, in a 
target-absent line-up, if the eyewitness chooses a suspect, they have made a false 
identification. This is the most dangerous of all possible outcomes, as this may result in 
innocent individuals being sent to jail because they have been mistakenly identified. The 
other option in the target-absent line-up is not choosing a suspect; this outcome is called 
the correct rejection. It is important to clarify that the police do not purposely create a 
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target-absent line-up. There is a suspect present in this line-up who is found through their 
investigation, but who may or may not be guilty of the crime. What makes this line-up 
target-absent is that the person who did in fact commit the crime is not present within this 
line-up, unknown to police. It is important to focus on the target-absent line-up because 
these are the innocent individuals affected when a false identification is made. Due to the 
severity and implications of these mistakes, the current study will address some of the 
issues within a familiar identification using the target-absent line-up only.  
 Chooses a Suspect 
Does not Choose the 
suspect 
Target-Present Correct Identification Bad Witness 
Target-Absent False Identification Correct Rejection 
Figure 1. Target line-up prediction chart based on choice outcomes. 
There are two main line-up procedures used by police where target-present or 
target-absent lineups can be presented, the simultaneous line-up, and the sequential line-
up. The simultaneous line-up is the more traditional line-up procedure, where witnesses 
look at multiple photographs at the same time, and are asked if the individual they saw is 
present in the line-up. Although this type of lineup is becoming less common, it is still 
used in law enforcement, and it is depicted in popular culture as what happens in an 
eyewitness situation. The sequential line-up procedure, which is now more commonly 
used in law enforcement, is when photographs are presented to the witness one at a time, 
requiring them to make an absolute judgment about an individual before they can see 
another picture (McQuiston-Surrett, Malpass, & Tredoux, 2006). The sequential line-up 
procedure has been demonstrated to result in fewer false identifications in comparison to 
a simultaneous line-up (Carlson, Gronlund, & Clark, 2008; Clark, & Davey, 2005; Flowe, 
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& Bessemer, 2011; Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, & Goodsell, 2009; Humphries, Holliday, 
& Flowe, 2012; Palmer, & Brewer, 2012; Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011). But there are 
still techniques that should be used to ensure the best accuracy in this practice.  In a study 
by Horry, et al. (2012) some participants were given a sequential line-up with six 
photographs, and some were given a sequential line-up with an unknown number of 
photographs. This procedure is called backloading (Horry, et al, 2012). In the conditions 
where participants were given the six photographs, it was found that more 
misidentifications were happening on the sixth position. The participants in the 
backloaded conditions made fewer misidentification errors, and did not choose a specific 
position consistently when making their identification.  
When people witness crimes, they first notice the individual’s face, and any 
distinctive elements of that face that may stand out. The distinctive feature issue can 
make it difficult for police officers to construct fair line-ups such that the individuals who 
are in the line-ups are not misidentified due to a scar, tattoo or other distinguishing 
feature. Zarkadi, et al. (2009) asked participants to look at 32 faces. Of these 32 faces, six 
of them had distinctive markings that would be easily remembered. After they were 
exposed to the images, they were set up in a task where they were asked to identify which 
suspects were in the original 32 images they were presented with. In some cases, the six 
images that originally had distinctive markings, were concealed so the participant had to 
remember the face and not the marking. Participants were significantly more likely to 
correctly select the suspect when distinctive features were replicated across foils rather 
than concealed on the target. These results emphasize how important it is that all people 
in the line-ups match the witness’ description of the criminal, so the identifications are 
14 
recalled from memory and not identified because of a marking. The authors replicated 
their study with a target-absent scenario and found that in the target-absent line-ups, 
participants incorrectly selected an innocent foil in both concealment and replication 
conditions. For the purpose of this experiment, the simultaneous line-up is used because 
error rate is needed, and the sequential line-up is known to have better accuracy.  
Familiarity and Overconfidence. A substantial amount of research has been 
done on the accuracy of eyewitness identification when a suspect is familiar to the 
eyewitness (Collishaw, & Hole, 2000; Kerstholt, et al, 1992; Read, 1995; Read, et al, 
1990). Whereas first impression research explains that brief exposures to unfamiliar faces 
are sufficient for people to make social judgments (Rule, et al., 2009; Stewart, et al, 2012; 
Todorov, et al., 2013; Todorov, et al., 2009; Todorov, et al., 2010), eyewitness 
identification research suggests that exposure to familiar faces can lead to 
misidentification as a result of overconfidence (Kerstholt, et al., 1992; Read, et al., 1990). 
Read (1995) examined the effect of increased exposure time on store clerks’ ability to 
accurately recognize and identify a target. Half of the clerks had a short exposure time to 
the target (30-60 seconds), the other half had a longer exposure time (4-12 minutes). Two 
days later after the clerks were asked to return to identify the target out of an eyewitness 
line-up. For both the target-present and target-absent line-ups, the clerks who were 
exposed longer to the target were twice as likely to misidentify the target. But this effect 
was amplified in the target-absent line-up.  
According to Kerstholt, et al., (1992), this reduced accuracy occurs because 
eyewitnesses feel more confident they can make an accurate identification, and thus 
causes them to choose a photograph more often. This is a problem when the target is 
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absent from the line-up, causing the eyewitness to (incorrectly) choose someone who 
looks most familiar to them and not the actual criminal.   
In many cases, when the eyewitness knows additional information about the 
suspect, such as information about this person’s background, personality, or prior 
incidents that have happened to this individual, it serves as “priming” which increases the 
probability of misidentification (Baker, ten Brinke, Porter, 2013; Kerstholt et al, 1992; 
Read, 1995). Having the additional information about the suspect creates a sense of 
familiarity to the eyewitness. When the eyewitness is expecting a familiar person to be 
presented in a line-up there is a 44% increase in false-positives (Kerstholt et al, 1992) 
because the expectation causes the eyewitness to identify strangers as being familiar 
(Young, Hay, & Ellis, 1985). Gobbini and Haxby (2007) explain how the recognition of 
the familiar face involves not only visual familiarity, but also emotional responses that 
are stored in long-term memory. According to Kerstholt et al. (1992), a successful 
identification of a familiar face occurs when there is additional, and specific, information 
remembered about the individual that is being recognized. This phenomenon sounds a lot 
like the Mere-exposure effect. The Mere-exposure effect is described as an implicit 
positive affective reaction to a repeated or “familiar” stimuli (in this case a face) (Ye & 
van Raaij, 1997).  
There are scenarios where eyewitnesses must make repeated identifications from 
different line-ups, whether this is from a mugshots, or from an identifications in court. 
Being double exposed to an individual could have an impact on accuracy and confidence 
of identification the eyewitness is making. When eyewitnesses view a suspect for the first 
time in a line-up they are using their recognition from their episodic memory. When they 
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are looking at the suspect for a second time, or being “double exposed”, they may be 
remembering the suspect from the photographed line-up and not the actual crime. In a 
study conducted by Steblay et al. (2013), witnesses were asked to view a video of a crime 
and were then asked to identify the suspect from the first line-up, and then were asked to 
complete this task again two weeks later. They found that identification errors that were 
made in the first round were continued into the second round. Despite evidence 
suggesting these procedures are not working, and are considered reckless, these forms of 
repeated identification tasks are still used in practice (Behrman, & Davey, 2001; Steblay, 
2011).  
This familiarity should not be confused with unconscious transference.  
Unconscious transference is a misidentification of an innocent person who is familiar to 
the eyewitness from a different context (Davis, Loftus, Vanous, & Cucciare, 2008; Read, 
Tollestrup, Hammersley, McFadzen, & Christensen, 1990; Ross, Ceci, Dunning, Toglia, 
1994). When the authors are discussing familiarity in the context of unconscious 
transference, they are referring to previously seeing an individual’s face. This is also 
known as the familiarity effect (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006).  Davis et al 
(2008) explained how there was two primary types of unconscious transference, the first 
describing misidentifications happening when eyewitnesses were recalling faces from 
mug shots, and not the actual crime (Deffenbacker, et al, 2006; Dysart, Lindsay, 
Hammond, & Dupuis, 2001). The second describing the misidentification happening with 
someone who was present at the crime, but was not the assailant. It should be noted that 
unconscious transference, though important, will not be established in the following 
study. Before continuing, there is value in focusing on facial perceptions and how brief 
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exposure to a face may influence decisions made in certain social situations. In the 
context of a familiar eyewitness identification when meeting the suspect before the crime 
takes place, past research would suggest the moment the individual was exposed to their 
face, a judgment was made.  
First impressions in faces 
Facial recognition research suggests first impressions are a powerful predictor in a 
variety of social situations. As mentioned above, these social situations can range from 
hiring and jury decisions to mate selection and building social in-groups at school (Gilron 
& Gutches, 2012; Korva, et al., 2012; Krendl, Magoon, Hull, & Heatherton, 2011; 
Langlois, et al., 2000; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Porter, et al., 2010; Todorov, et al., 
2005).  Brief exposures to unfamiliar faces are sufficient for people to make social 
judgments related to trustworthiness and aggressiveness (Rule, Ambady, & Adams, 2009; 
Stewart, et al, 2012; Todorov, Mende-Siedlecki, & Dotsch, 2013; Todorov, Pakrashi, & 
Oosterhof, 2009; Todorov, Loehr, & Oosterhof, 2010) and these evaluations successfully 
predict outcomes in elections (Mattes, Spezio, Kim, Todorov, Adolphs, & Alvarez, 2010; 
Todorov, et al., 2005), and the success of corporate executives (Rule & Ambady, 2008).  
Competence emerges as one of the most important trait attributes when making 
evaluations about politicians (Todorov, et al. 2005).  The candidates who were perceived 
as more competent won their riding 71.6% of the time in the United States Senate and 
66.8% of the time in the US House of Representatives races in the congressional 
elections of 2000, 2002, and 2004. Interestingly, inferences of competence not only 
predicted the winners but differences between judgments of competing candidates were 
also positively correlated to the margins of victory between candidates. A similar study 
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by Rule, and Ambady (2008), selected the 25 highest and 25 lowest ranked companies 
from the 2006 Fortune 500 Website. This website shows all the statistics in regards to 
income and success of the Chief Executive Officer’s Company. The researchers took the 
Chief Executive Officer’s pictures and had participants rate them for trustworthiness, 
competence, likability, leadership, and dominance. It was found after controlling for age, 
attractiveness, and emotion, that positive perceptions from the participants predicted the 
Chief Executive Officer’s success.  These first impression evaluations of facial 
appearance appear to be subconscious judgments stemming from the structural 
characteristics of the face (Todorov, 2008). Specifically, these judgments are implicit, 
meaning that the individual making the judgment is unaware as to why they are making 
the decision, but rather that it just “is” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  
Dangerous Decision Theory.  As mentioned previously, Dangerous Decision 
Theory (Porter and ten Brinke, 2009) offers a testable model outlining the processes 
involved in arriving at an evaluation of trust. Their theory suggests a first impression of a 
stranger’s face is made the instant they make visual contact with them. Porter, et al 
(2010) tested their model using two vignettes that described either major or minor crimes 
with a photograph of a defendant who was rated as either trustworthy or untrustworthy. 
Participants evaluated culpability after viewing all the evidence that was presented in the 
case (see Figure 2). They found that participants needed less evidence to arrive at a guilty 
verdict, and were more confident about this decision when the defendant was perceived 
as having an untrustworthy face. It was also found that untrustworthy defendants were 
considered to be more guilty based on “ambiguous” evidence, where defendants 
perceived as being more trustworthy needed more incriminating evidence for a 
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conviction (Porter, et al. 2010). 
 
Figure 2. Porter & ten Brinke (2009) Dangerous Decision Theory Model. 
In a continuation of this work, Korva, et al. (2012) wanted to examine the role of 
specific individual differences on decisions made. Their previous experiment (Porter, et 
al, 2010) used two vignettes that described either major or minor crimes. Participants 
evaluated culpability after viewing all evidence presented. These images were also 
evaluated for trustworthiness, attractiveness, likability, criminality, and whether or not 
they have a “baby face”. From these ratings, the highest and lowest rated individuals 
were used for the final study. In the second study, two questionnaires were used to assess 
participant’s attitudes and biases toward the legal system, The Pretrial Juror Attitude 
Questionnaire1, and the Justice-Vengeance Scale2. Participants endorsing justice–
fairness3 were more likely to exonerate an untrustworthy looking defendant, but less 
                                                          
1 Identifies individual differences in legal attitudes that assess how trial information is processed in legal 
decision-making 
2 Assesses two predominant motives (justice and vengeance) that may be aroused by the legal system.   
3 Which is the opposite of Justice-Vengeance 
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likely to exonerate a trustworthy looking one. Individuals who held a strong racial bias4, 
by contrast, were less likely to be influenced by exonerating evidence, specifically for 
untrustworthy looking defendants. This study also supports the Dangerous Decision 
Theory, but broadens it by showing that faces varying in trustworthiness are still 
activating bias behaviour from the participant. 
Continuing to test the model, Baker et al. (2013) suggested any information given 
about a stranger will elaborate the first impression originally made. Their study suggests 
there is a bi-directional relationship between decision-making and the first impression. 
The authors examined if information concerning moral actions would influence the 
observers’ recall in facial trustworthiness, such that a target who has engaged in criminal 
actions will be recalled as appearing less trustworthy than they had initially appeared to 
the observer.  Participants were given an initial “neutral” face, and then were asked to 
read a vignette about the target’s actions (randomly assigned conditions of either 
immoral, morally neutral, or altruistic behaviour).  Participants were asked to make a 
judgment on whether or not they should be punished, rewarded, or have no repercussions 
for the target’s actions.  After a 30-minute delay, participants were asked to recall the 
face they were presented with earlier in the study. During this phase of the study, they 
were presented with a constantly changing image of the individual’s face, and asked to 
pinpoint when the image replicated the person they saw earlier in the study. It was found 
that observers presented with the immoral vignette mistakenly recognized a less 
trustworthy version of the target than the actual face they had viewed in the beginning of 
the study. On the other hand, this effect did not happen with the altruistic vignette, which 
                                                          
4 Which is measured within the Juror- Attitudes questionnaire. 
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suggests this decision may be uniquely related to the negative information about the 
target. This study suggests there is a potentially biasing effect on an individual’s 
knowledge of another person after they learn information about their past that is 
considered “immoral”.  
When people must make a decision about an individual based on small amounts 
of information, implicit decisions become a factor in these judgments. van’t Wout, and 
Sanfey (2008) asked participants to play a “trust game” where they made decisions 
regarding a partner’s face, and then identified an amount of money they trusted their 
partner to return to them. For an understanding of how the decisions were made about the 
indivduals, it is necessary to explain how the game is played. 
In a standard Trust Game two anonymous persons, an investor and partner, 
interact with one another. The investor is given a certain amount of money and informed 
that they have the opportunity to transfer some amount of this money to their partner. 
They can transfer no money, the entire amount of money, or any amount in between. The 
money transferred by the investor is then multiplied by the experimenter (usually by a 
factor of 3 or 4) and given to the partner. The partner, with whom the investor is not 
allowed to communicate during the game, then has the opportunity to transfer back some 
of the multiplied amount to the investor. In essence, the partner has a choice between 
honouring and abusing trust. If the partner honours trust and returns more money than 
transferred by the investor, both players end up with a higher monetary payoff than was 
originally obtained. However, if the partner abuses trust, the investor ends up with less 
money than the initial endowment, whereas the partner ends up with a large profit (van't 
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Wout & Sanfey, 2008). The decisions made by the investor and their partner are based on 
the photograph of the partner. Each participant was asked to play this game with 79 faces, 
which had previous ratings of trust from a pilot study, to see if their implicit decisions to 
trust an individual were similar to the previous ratings of trustworthiness from a separate 
sample. After participants decided whether or not they trusted their partners, they were 
presented facial recognition task. Participants were presented with 150 different faces; 79 
of them were from their “trust game”. Faces presented in the “trust game” were given 
higher recognition ratings than faces that were new to the participant. It was also found 
that recognition was better for faces that were rated as trustworthy by participants as 
compared to faces that were rated as being untrustworthy. 
Trust. The evaluation of trust is a reoccurring theme in first impression research.  
There are specific facial structures that are involved in the identification of 
trustworthiness in a face; higher eyebrows, more pronounced cheekbones, shallow nose 
sellion, and wider chins, are specific signals of trustworthiness (Bar, Neta, & Linz., 2006; 
Stewart et al., 2012; Todorov, 2008; Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008; Vartanian et 
al., 2012; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Flowe (2012) argues that trust and dominance is 
spontaneously evaluated from facial features. Participants were asked to rate the 
emotional state, personality traits, and criminal appearance of faces shown in 
photographs. Both male and female faces rated high in criminal appearance were 
perceived as less trustworthy and more dominant. It should be noted that this is based on 
the “perception” of the evaluators, and not the actual innocence or guilt of the individuals 
in the photographs. This does not mean that there is a correlation between criminality and 
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trustworthiness, but rather people’s perception of trustworthiness is related to whether or 
not they think the person is a criminal. 
Suzuki and Suga (2010) investigated whether our mind copes with remembering 
trustworthy-looking cheaters compared to remembering untrustworthy-looking cheaters. 
We are more likely to trust and cooperate with the former, resulting in a higher risk of 
unreciprocated cooperation by enhancing memory for trustworthy-looking cheaters. 
Participants played a debt game, where they learned to discriminate among good, neutral, 
and bad lenders, who respectively charged no, moderate, and high interest on the debt. 
Each lender had either a trustworthy- or untrustworthy-looking face. In the end, the 
researchers found that bad traits associated with trustworthy-looking faces were better 
remembered than those associated with untrustworthy looking faces. This effect has an 
adaptive significance that protects us from exploitation by trustworthy-looking cheaters 
in social exchange. This study shows that just because you are perceived as being 
trustworthy, it does not mean that you will not deceive your partner. The researchers 
found that the more trustworthy you look, the more likely you are to be remembered. If 
you are trustworthy “looking” but also a cheater, you are more likely to be recognized in 
comparison to someone who is not perceived as being trustworthy.  This finding is 
interesting as it is similar to van’t Wout, and Sanfey (2008), where participants 
recognized the trustworthy face better than the untrustworthy face. 
Attractiveness. When discussing first impressions and making judgments about 
others based on interactions in social situations, perceptions of attractiveness is an 
important concept to consider. Facial attractiveness is considered holistically, which often 
acts as an assessment for romance and health (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 
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1991; Jones, Little, Penton-Voak, Tiddeman, Burt, & Perrett, 2001; Pegors, Mattar, 
Bryan, & Epstein, 2015; Perrett, Burt, Penton-Voak, Lee, Rowland, & Edwards, 1999). A 
substantial amount of literature has focused on how attractiveness influences all 
judgments, and may even lead individuals to make drastic decisions about people based 
on their perception of attractiveness (Little, Jones, & DeBruine, 2014; Maeder, 
Yamamoto, & Saliba, 2015; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Rennels & Kayl, 2015; Stockemer 
& Praino, 2015). Based on these findings, many facial researchers control for 
attractiveness, allowing them to look at other variables, or how other factors can counter 
these decisions (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993; Rule & Ambady, 2008; Todorov et al, 
2005; Willis & Todorov, 2006).  
There has been debate surrounding whether attractiveness pulls judgments of 
trust, or if they are dichotomous in their measures. In an experiment by Braun, Peus, and 
Frey (2012) they discussed how attractiveness affects female leaders; specifically related 
to how women who are attractive are less likely to be elected as a leader. They tested how 
leader gender, leader attractiveness, and leadership style influenced followers’ trust and 
loyalty. Results showed that attractiveness did not influence trustworthiness or loyalty for 
both male and female leaders with the specific transactional leadership style. In specific 
social situations it can be said that attractiveness and trustworthiness are not measured the 
same way. This was also found in laboratory experiments where people perceived 
unknown guilty individuals as being more attractive and less trustworthy based on facial 
appearance alone (Carter-Rogers, Jakeman, Floyd, & Smith, 2013; Carter-Rogers, Smith, 
Floyd, & Chafe, 2015). This has also been found to vary within gender (Chafe, Carter-
Rogers, Pye-Strowbridge, Smith, & Habib, under review). In this experiment, 
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attractiveness is measured as a way to determine if attractiveness judgments influence 
accuracy from an eyewitness perspective.  
The Present Research 
 
There are implications to someone being familiar. The initial impression they 
leave is arguably the impression that one will have of them permanently. Additional 
exposure can result in change, but this first impression is the basis for all future change. 
Baker, et al. (2013) suggest there is a potentially biased effect on an individual’s 
knowledge of another person after they learn “immoral” information about their past. 
That is, having forming a first impression about someone, and then hearing additional 
information about them may sway this initial first impression.  The objective of this study 
is to investigate whether first impressions influence decisions when the target is familiar 
to the eyewitness. For this experiment three factors were distinguished as “familiarity”: 
the exposure to the face, receiving additional information, and making judgments about 
the suspect based on the other two factors.  
I expect that received information about an individual, will impact accuracy in target 
absent lineups. Specifically: 
H1a: Participants who are familiar with the target will have better accuracy in 
target-absent line-ups when receiving positive information.  
H1b: Individuals receiving negative information will be less accurate in target-
absent line-ups.  
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H2: There will be a main effect on confidence and accuracy; such that confidence 
will lower post identification when having misidentified the target.  
H3: Individuals in familiar conditions who identify incorrectly will decrease in 
confidence in comparison to participants who did identify correctly in the familiar and 
unfamiliar conditions.  
H4: There will be a main effect on confidence, and information where participants 




The sample population5 (N = 171) was recruited from Saint Mary’s University, 
using the SONA Psychology bonus system, and bonus points in an Anthropology class on 
campus (ANTH 2282). A number of demographic questions (Appendix A) were asked to 
gather a profile of the current participant pool.  Participants predominately identified as 
Caucasian (64.1%) female (70%), between the ages of 17-47 years old (M = 21.44, SD = 
4.21). 32.7% of the participants reported they were currently working, leaving the other 
67.3% reporting they were full-time students who were currently unemployed. 
Participants were asked to recall their parent’s approximate combined household income 
while they were growing up. 26.2% of the participants fell into the low income bracket 
($35,000 or lower)6, 33.4% fell into the medium income bracket ($35,001 to $99,999)7, 
                                                          
5 SES, ethnicity, country, age, gender, and working status were collected but are not analyzed for the 
purpose of this thesis. No specific predictions were made in regard to these factors.  
6 It should be noted that 14.9% of the low income sample were considered living in poverty (Lower than 
$20,000 per year).  
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leaving the remaining participants in the high income bracket with 40.5% ($100,000 or 
higher). Participants were also asked to self-report what socioeconomic status they 
considered themselves to be from. 10.6% felt they were from the low income bracket, 
81.2% felt they were from the middle income bracket, and 8.2% felt they were from the 
high income bracket (Hodges, & Brown, 2013; MacLeans, 2015).   
Research Design 
Independent Variables. Familiarity (exposure to targets face). In the familiar 
condition, they were exposed the targets face. In the unfamiliar condition they did not see 
the targets face. First impression information, which is 1 of 3 categories of information 
given to the participant (positive, neutral, negative).  
Outcome Variables. Accuracy is determined based on whether or not the 
individual decides to choose an individual from the simultaneous line-up. Non-choosers 
are considered to be accurate. This creates a dichotomous variable of correct, and 
incorrect. Judgments of trustworthiness, competence, and attractiveness are taken as 
predictors of positive or negative first impressions. Target, for manipulation check 
purposes, two different targets were used. Confidence is measured as time, a before and 
after measure of confidence to see change throughout the experiment. Pre-confidence 
which is measured after giving their evaluation of trustworthiness, competence, and 
attractiveness. Post-confidence measured after they are exposed to the line-up. For the 
repeated measure ANOVA, the measurement of “time” will be considered as the within-
subjects variable.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 It should be noted that medium income ranges due to described levels of low-medium, and high-medium 
income.  
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We used a 2 (Face: familiar, unfamiliar) X 3 (First impression information: 
positive, neutral, negative) X 2 (Target: Target 1 and Target 2) design. There were two 
confederates used as the target to ensure there was no effect due to the specific target. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of twelve different conditions. 
Participants in “familiar” conditions were given the same amount of exposure time to the 
target, and were asked the same questions about the scenario they were shown. 
Participants who were in the “unfamiliar” condition were not exposed to the individual’s 
face, but were given the same impression information about the target. Specifically, 
participants were asked to rate their target on attractiveness, trustworthiness, and 
competence, and then after a filler task asked to identify their target from a simultaneous 
line-up.  
Procedure 
The experiment was built on the Qualtric online survey tool, and participants are 
asked to come into the lab and complete the experiment using a computer in a laboratory 
setting..This was done to ensure participants were exposed to the same controlled 
environment. Participants are told that the experiment is about different interactions with 
strangers, and how those certain interactions influence judgments and first impressions. 
They were also told that they will be watching a short video, and that their full attention 
is required.  
The script describes a scenario where the participant is at a diner with a friend, 
when an individual (Target) approaches them. This target is well known to the friend. 
They are exposed to this target while the friend catches up with them briefly in the 
familiar conditions. At this time in the study, the targets photograph was on the screen 
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(conditions 1-38). When the conversation ends the friend proceeds to tell the participant 
additional information (first impression information) about the target they just met (either 
positive, neutral, or negative information depending on the condition). In the conditions 
where the participants will not be exposed to the face, they will only receive the first 
impression information (conditions 4-6). Participants are presented with a filler task to 
simulate time passing in the diner. Appropriately, the participants were given a menu, and 
told that they must choose three items from the menu, ensuring that they do not break 
their budget of twenty dollars after taxes are included. After placing their order, and 
ensuring they stayed within the budget, the rest of the script continues.  Participants are 
then notified that they are leaving the diner, and at this point in the experiment 
participants see an ambiguous video which the target is present in. In all conditions, 
participants were prompted by their “friend” that the individual they see running is the 
individual they either were exposed to earlier (1-3) or who the friend was referring to (4-
6). Following this scene, participants were asked to describe the individual in the video, 
and make a judgment about this target measuring for attractiveness, competence, and 
trustworthiness. After making their judgments of this target, participants were asked to 
describe the video. At this point in the experiment, participants were asked to record how 
confident they were that they could identify this individual from an eyewitness line-up. 
After taking a pre-confidence rating, participants were shown a simultaneous target-
absent line-up. After seeing the eyewitness line-up, and making a decision, they were 
asked how confident they are that they made the right decision. It is understood that the 
sequential line-up produces less error when eyewitnesses are identifying suspects. For the 
                                                          
8 Conditions were labeled 1-6, a and b, based on their target. 1-6a were the first target, and 1-6b were the 
second target.  
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purpose of this study, we used the simultaneous line-up to create a higher error rate in 
order to help identify any differences between conditions.  
Materials 
 Script. This is the narrative throughout the experiment. It tells a story in regards 
to the encounter with the target, as well as the interview the participant has with a 
figurative police officer (Appendix B) 
 Facial Stimuli. The Social Attitudes Psychology Laboratory at Saint Mary’s 
University has a collection of faces dated from 1990 to 2015. These images have been 
piloted and measured for attractiveness, competence, trustworthiness, and criminality. 
Two volunteered confederates were used as the base line for target 1 and target 2 (see 
figure 3).  Research assistants from the lab were part of a focus group to assign foils from 




























Figure 3.  Facial stimuli used for target 1 and target 2.   
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 Depending on the condition participants are randomly assigned to, they received 
facial stimuli as their familiar or unfamiliar target. To ensure there is no individual person 
effect, two separate stimuli were randomly assigned for judgments.  
 Other facial stimuli used in this experiment were shown to the participant during 
the simultaneous line-up procedure. 
 First impression Information. Depending on the condition participants were 
assigned to, they received a vignette with additional information about the target (e.g., 
negative, neutral9, or positive information). An example of the negative information is:  
“That was John. I went to high school with him. He basically failed every class he was 
ever in. As you can see, he did not amount to much. I am not sure what he does for a 
living, but I know that when we were in high school he used to sell drugs instead of 
getting a real job like the rest of us.” An example of the positive information is: “That 
was John. I went to high school with him. He was a straight A student. As you can see, he 
is pretty successful. I am pretty sure he went to school for dentistry, but I know that when 
we were in high school he used to be on the yearbook committee. He was involved in the 
community center.” 
 Ambiguous Video. Participants were presented with an ambiguous video. In this 
video, the target was running towards them down the street, suddenly turning their head 
to look behind them.  
 Judgment Measures.  Participants were asked to give their perceptions of 
competence (Todorov et al., 2005), trustworthiness (Flowe, 2012), and attractiveness 
                                                          
9 No information was given in this condition making it a control condition.  
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(Rule & Ambady, 2008), of the facial stimuli they received using a Likert-type scale 
ranging from very unlikely to be said trait (1) to very likely to be said trait (7) (Appendix 
E) 
Confidence Measures.   Participants were asked to give a rating to their 
perceived accuracy in the identification of the target, asking how confident they were. 
After they made a decision about the identification line-up, they were given a post-
confidence measure. Using a Likert-type scale participants were asked “How confident 
are you that you can make an accurate identification?” After seeing the lineup and 
making a decision they were asked; “How confident are you that you made the right 
decision”? (Appendix F) 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
Foil frequency in the target-absent line-up. Descriptive statistics were run on 
the frequency of the choices on the target-absent line-up; 61.4% of the participants made 
correct rejections. 12.9% of participants chose the foil in place one. 1.8% of participants 
chose the foil in place two. 14% of participants chose the foil in place three. 1.8% of 
participants chose the foils in place four. 5.3% of participants chose the foil in place five. 
Finally, 2.9% of participants chose the foil in place six (see figure 4).  
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Figure 4.  Target-Absent Line-up  
A One-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the judgments of the target in 
familiar and unfamiliar groups. To ensure that the manipulations were working, we 
wanted there to be no significant difference in the judgments of trustworthiness, 
competence, and attractiveness in the two types of groups.  
Judgment manipulation check overall and for targets. When looking at 
perceptions of trust in familiar (M = 3.57, SD = 1.06), and unfamiliar (M = 3.72, SD = 
1.20) groups, there was no significant difference; F(1,169) = .831 , p = .363. We also 
found no significant difference in perceptions of competence in familiar (M = 4.11, SD = 
1.19), and unfamiliar (M = 4.01, SD = 1.08), groups; F(1,169) = .352 , p = .554. Finally, 
we found no significant difference in perceptions of attractiveness in familiar (M = 3.22, 





Comparing familiar and unfamiliar groups to ensure similar judgments within conditions 
on same images. 
 Familiar Unfamiliar     
 M SD M SD df F 
Judgments      
Trustworthiness 3.57 1.06 3.73 1.20 169   .831 
Competence 4.11 1.19 4.01 1.08 169   .352 
Attractiveness 3.22 1.30 3.43 1.42 169 1.103 
Note. Manipulation check 
This manipulation was also split between each target to ensure that we were not 
having an individual effect. For Target 1, when looking at perceptions of trust in familiar 
(M = 3.76, SD = 1.13), and unfamiliar (M = 4.06, SD = 1.17) conditions, there was no 
significant difference; F(1,85) = 1.383 , p = .243. We also found no significant difference 
in perceptions of competence in familiar (M = 4.23, SD = 1.22), and unfamiliar (M = 
4.23, SD = 0.99), conditions; F(1,85) = .000 , p = .995. Finally, we found no significant 
difference in perceptions of attractiveness in familiar (M = 3.54, SD = 1.19), and 
unfamiliar (M = 3.90, SD = 1.32) groups; F(1,85) = 1.715, p = .194. For Target 2, when 
looking at perceptions of trust in familiar (M = 3.38, SD = 0.95), and unfamiliar (M = 
3.36, SD = 1.12) groups, there was no significant difference; F(1,82) = .002 , p = .960. 
We also found no significant difference in perceptions of competence in familiar (M = 
4.00, SD = 1.15), and unfamiliar (M = 3.77, SD = 1.14), groups; F(1,82) = .824 , p = .367. 
Finally, we found no significant difference in perceptions of attractiveness in familiar (M 
= 2.90, SD = 1.34), and unfamiliar (M = 2.93, SD = 1.35) groups; F(1,82) = .012, p = 




Comparing familiar and unfamiliar conditions with Target 1 and Target 2 to ensure that 
each target is perceived the same way in both conditions. 
  Familiar Unfamiliar    
  M SD M SD df F  
       
Target 1 Trustworthiness 3.77 1.13 4.06 1.17 1,85 1.383 
 Competence 4.23 1.22 4.23 0.99 1,85   .000 
 Attractiveness 3.54 1.19 3.90 1.32 1,85 1.715 
        
Target 2 Trustworthiness 3.38 0.95 3.36 1.12 1,82   .002 
 Competence 4.00 1.15 3.77 1.14 1,82   .824 
 Attractiveness 2.90 1.34 2.93 1.35 1,82   .012 
Note.  Manipulation check 
 
Individual effect. We conducted a one-way between subjects ANOVA 
comparing each target to each other based on perceptions of trust, competence and 
attractiveness. There was a significant effect for trustworthiness [F(1,169) = 11.12, p = 
.001], where Target 1 (M = 3.93, SD = 1.15) was perceived as more trustworthy in 
comparison to Target 2 (M = 3.37, SD = 1.04). There was a significant effect for 
competence [F(1,169) = 4.14, p = .043], where Target 1 (M = 4.23, SD = 1.09) was 
perceived as more competent in comparison to Target 2 (M = 3.88, SD = 1.14). There 
was also a significant effect for attractiveness [F(1,169) = 28.66, p < .001], where Target 
1 (M = 3.74, SD = 1.27) was perceived as more attractive in comparison to Target 2 (M = 
2.92, SD = 1.34). Based on this statistical analysis, Target 1 was perceived more 




Comparing Target 1 and Target 2 to see if there is an individual effect. 
 Target 1 Target 2    
 M SD M SD df F 
Judgments      
Trustworthiness 3.93 1.16 3.37 1.04 1, 169   11.12** 
Competence 4.23 1.10 3.88 1.14 1, 169    4.14* 
Attractiveness 3.74 1.27 2.92 1.34 1, 169  16.86*** 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. This manipulation checked for an individual effect, 
further analysis found no individual effect is present. 
To ensure that this phenomenon did not impact the overall results, a chi-square 
was performed to see if there was a difference in accuracy depending on which target the 
participants received. It was found that there was no significant difference in accuracy 
based on which target the participants was presented with (2= 0.119, p = .655, df = 1).  
Judgments reflecting first impression information. Following this check, it 
was essential to establish the effectiveness of manipulations of first impression. This 
would be demonstrated by participants perceiving individuals as either more trustworthy, 
and/or more competent in the positive conditions, and less trustworthy, and/or less 
competent in the negative conditions. Due to literature discussing the halo effect (Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977), where attractive people can do no wrong, we want to ensure there is no 
significant difference between the three conditions when assessing attractiveness.  
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the perceived 
judgments (trust, competence, and attractiveness) in the first impression information in 
positive, neutral, and negative conditions (see Table 4). There was a significant effect for 
trustworthiness in first impression information for the three conditions [F(2,168) = 4.57, 
p = .012]. Post hoc comparison using Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for 
the negative condition (M = 3.32, SD = 1.19) was significantly different from the neutral 
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condition (M = 3.96, SD = 0.99). That is, participants in the negative condition perceived 
the individual as being less trustworthy in comparison to the participants in the neutral 
condition. There was no significant difference between the positive condition (M = 3.66, 
SD = 1.14) and negative condition (M = 3.32, SD = 1.19) when looking at 
trustworthiness. However, the means are in the right direction.  There was also a 
significant effect for competence in first impression information for the three conditions 
[F(2,168) = 6.01, p = .003]. Post hoc comparison using Tukey HSD test indicates that the 
mean score for the negative condition (M = 3.66, SD = 1.22) was significantly different 
from the positive condition (M = 4.37, SD = 1.04).  That is, participants in the negative 
condition perceived individuals as being less competent in comparison to the participants 
in the positive condition.  There was no significant effect for attractiveness in first 
impression information for the three conditions [F(2,168) = .70, p = .498]. 
Table 4 
Determining perceived judgments for conditions. 
Condition  Judgments 
     
  Trustworthiness Competence Attractiveness 
Negative  3.32a 3.66b 3.15 
Neutral  3.96a 4.09 3.39 
Positive  3.66 4.37b 3.44 
a Comparing judgments of participants findings show trustworthiness is perceived more negative in the 
negative condition [F(2,168) = 4.57, p = .012]. 
 b Comparing judgments of participants findings show competence is perceived more positive in positive 
condition and more negatively in negative condition [F(2,168) = 6.01, p = .003]. 
 
A correlation was conducted to assess the relationships between judgments of 
trustworthiness, competence, and attractiveness. A correlation between all three variables 
was found. Essentially, this means that ratings of trustworthiness, competence, and 
attractiveness significantly impacted each other (see Table 5). This is expected especially 
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within the first impression literature, where individuals are normally perceived positively, 
or negatively universally (Rule & Ambady, 2008; Todorov, 2008; Todorov, et al, 2005).  
Table 5 
Correlations for judgments of trustworthiness, competence, and attractiveness 
(N = 171) 
 
Variables  1 2 3 
1. Trustworthiness -   
2. Competence .635** -  
3. Attractiveness .421** .361** - 
Note. ** p = .01 two-tailed 
 
Main Analysis 
Logistic Regression. A logistic regression analysis was conducted to predict 
which type of first impression information had the greatest accuracy rate.  The dependent 
variable accuracy was put into the model, and was separated by response; correct 
rejection (n = 105), and false identifications (n = 66).  With no predictors in the model, 
and looking at the participants who identified correctly, 61.4% of the participants were 
predicted to make a correct rejection. The constant model was significant (p = .003). This 
explains that there is a significantly different base rate.   A test of the model when adding 
the predictors familiarity, and first impression type against the constant model with no 
predictors (omnibus table), was not statistically significant, (2 = 2.280, p = .320, df = 2). 
This can be explained by the significant base rate discussed in the constant model. The 
logistic regression base rate is very sensitive to the uneven dependent variable. It is 
important to assess this finding closer using a chi-square.  
With the predictors entered into the model, the hit rate improves to 62.6%. 
Familiarity was significant (p = .037), showing that in familiar conditions there was a 
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3.12 times increase in odds that an individual will be accurate in a target-absent line-up 
(see Table 5).  First impression information was not significant (p = .577), seeming to 
show no support for H1a and b. An information by familiarity interaction was put into the 
model, showing no significance (p = .321) (see Table 6).  
Table 6 
Logistic regression analysis to predicting the most accurate first impression 
manipulation in target absent lineups influenced by familiarity 
Variable B Wald df p-value Exp(B) 
1. Familiarity 1.137 4.366 1 *.037 3.117 
2. First impression Information  1.100 2 .577  
Negative .451 .787 1 .375 1.569 
Neutral .473 .838 1 .360 1.606 
3. Familiarity X First Impression Information  2.271 2 .321  
Negative -.238 .083 1 .774 .788 
Neutral -1.110 2.084 1 .149 .329 
Note. First impression information is a categorical variable being compared to the positive information 
condition.   * p < .05  
Chi-Square. An accuracy hit rate was conducted using the accuracy percentages 
within the familiar and unfamiliar conditions based on the first impression information 
(see Table 7). There was a significant difference when comparing positive and negative 
information within the familiar (77%) and unfamiliar conditions (47%) (2= 4.99, df = 1, 
p = .025). That is, participants who were exposed to positive information in the familiar 
conditions, have more identification accuracy in comparison to participants who were 
exposed to negative information in the unfamiliar conditions. There is also a significant 
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difference within the positive conditions between familiar (73%) and unfamiliar 
conditions (47%) (2 = 4.50 df = 1, p = .034). That is, participants who were exposed to 
positive information in the familiar conditions, have more identification accuracy in 
comparison to participants who were exposed to positive information in the unfamiliar 
conditions. When looking within the negative condition, there was no significant 
difference between the familiar (77%) and unfamiliar condition (58%). But as you can 
see from these percentages, there was a trending effect happening between these 
conditions, in the similar direction to the positive information conditions. Participants in 
familiar conditions are more accurate when manipulating first impression information, 
specifically in the positive conditions. It should be noted that in the neutral condition, 
there is no significant difference, and no variance between the familiar (59%) and 
unfamiliar condition (59%) (2 = .002 df = 1, p = .961).  An independent sample t-test 
was run to assess the difference within the familiar condition. When looking within the 
familiar condition, there was no significant difference between the negative information 
(M = .77, SD = .43), and the neutral information (M = .59, SD = .50), t(46.86) = 1.36 , p = 
.182 10.  There was also no significant difference between the positive information (M = 
.73, SD = .45), condition, and the negative information condition (M = .77, SD = .43), 
t(50) = .318 , p = .752.   
  
                                                          
10 The Levene’s test for equality of variance was used for this statistic. 
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Table 7 
Eyewitness accuracy in target absent lineups across familiar and unfamiliar groups 
 
First Impression Information  Conditions 
 
   
  N Familiar N Unfamiliar Total 
N 
       
Negative   22 77%a 31 58% 53 
       
       
Neutral  27 59% 29 59% 56 
       
       
Positive   30 73%b 32 47%ab 62 
a Comparing positive to negative information, there is a significant difference between familiar and 
unfamiliar groups (2= 4.99, df = 1, p = .025) 
 b Comparing within positive information conditions, there is a significant between familiar and unfamiliar 
groups (2 = 4.50 df = 1, p = .034) 
 
 Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance. A correlation was conducted to 
assess the relationship between accuracy and pre and post confidence ratings. It was 
found that there was a relationship between all the variables, but that the accuracy, and 
post-confidence ratings was a stronger relationship (see Table 8).   
Table 8 
Correlations for accuracy, pre-confidence, and post-confidence 
(N = 171) 
 
Variables  1 2 3 
1. Accuracy -   
2. Pre-Confidence .169* -  
3. Post-Confidence .317** .448** - 
Note. * p = .05, ** p = .01 two-tailed 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare pre and post 
confidence, in positive, neutral, and negative first impression information conditions (see 
Table 9). There was a significant effect, Wilks’ Lambda = .861, F(1,159) = 25.57, p < 
.001; such that participants were less confident in their response on the post confidence 
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measure (M = 4.04, SD = 1.72), in comparison to their pre confidence (M = 4.56, SD = 
1.48), t(170) = 4.022 , p < .001. Thus, there was a decrease in confidence after making an 
identification. A significant confidence by accuracy main effect, Wilks’ Lambda = .946, 
F(1,159) = 9.11, p = .003) was also found; such that where participants who did not 
choose accurately (pre-confidence; M = 4.24, SD = 1.39) had decreased confidence (post-
confidence; M = 3.35, SD = 1.49) after the identification; t(65) = 4.569 , p <.001. This 
was not the case for the participants who chose not to identify anyone (pre-confidence; M 
= 4.75, SD = 1.50; post-confidence; M = 4.47, SD = 1.72); t(104) = 1.703, p = .092. That 
is, participants who made an inaccurate identification had more of a decrease in their 
confidence after making a choice in the lineup, supporting H2.  
Table 9 
Repeated Measures Confidence measured as time. 
Effect Wilks’ F-value Partial Eta Squared 
Confidence .861 25.57*** .139 
Accuracy .946 9.108** .054 
Familiarity .983 2.770† .017 
Information .966 2.782† .034 
Accuracy x Familiarity  .966 5.571* .034 
Accuracy x Information .979 1.729 .021 
Familiarity x Information .978 1.814 .022 
Accuracy x Familiarity x Information .997 0.275 .003 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
There was also a significant interaction on accuracy by familiarity, when 
measuring confidence at two different times, Wilks’ Lambda = .966, F(1,159) = 5.57, p = 
.019). When running a split file on accuracy to determine what is driving this effect, we 
found that participants in the familiar condition, who identified incorrectly in the 
simultaneous line-up, expressed that they were more confident about their identification 
ability during the first measure of confidence (M = 4.33, SD = 1.55), in comparison to 
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their final measure of confidence after they made the identification (M = 2.92, SD = 
1.32); t(23) = 4.377, p < .001. Meaning that participants who misidentified in familiar 
conditions, were less confident in their identifications in their post confidence measure, 
after stating they were very confident they could make the identification, supporting H3. 
This effect of pre-confidence (M = 4.19, SD = 1.31) significantly differing from post-
confidence (M = 3.60, SD = 1.55) is also present for participants who misidentified 
incorrectly in the unfamiliar condition, but not as strong, t(41) = 2.519, p = .016 (See 
figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Accuracy X Familiarity on Confidence shows that pre and post confidence differs in familiarity 




The final hypothesis (H4) was not supported, as there was no main effect on 
confidence and the information type that was received; Wilks’ Lambda = .966, F(1,159) 
= 2.782, p = .065. However, there was a trending effect where participants were more 
confident they could make an identification when receiving negative information, but less 
confident after they made their identification (see Table 10.  
Table 10 
Pre and post confidence mean ratings based on accuracy.  
  Pre-confidence Post-confidence    
  M SD M SD df t 
Wrong       
Familiar Negative 5.20 0.84 2.60 1.67 4 -3.83* 
 Neutral 4.18 1.54 3.36 1.36 10 -2.32* 
 Positive 4.00 1.85 2.50 0.93 7 -2.29† 
        
Unfamiliar Negative 4.23 1.36 3.69 1.55 12 -1.24 
 Neutral 4.08 1.31 3.91 1.73 11 -0.35 
 Positive 4.24 1.35 3.29 1.45 16 -2.70* 
        
Right       
Familiar Negative 5.35 1.22 5.18 1.28 16 -0.64 
 Neutral 4.44 1.75 4.75 1.88 15 0.58 
 Positive 4.86 1.28 4.18 1.76 21 -2.30* 
        
Unfamiliar Negative 4.17 1.89 4.33 2.03 17 .342 
 Neutral 4.88 1.50 4.47 1.23 16 -1.02 
 Positive 4.80 1.15 3.93 1.94 14 -1.94† 




Summary of Results and Implications.  
Manipulation checks showed that the perceived judgments of trustworthiness, 
competence, and attractiveness did not impact the familiar and unfamiliar groups, 
showing that positive judgments towards familiar people are not pulling any of the 
identifications. They also showed that the accuracy hit rate was not significant to just one 
of the targets, showing that these results are not because of an individual person. Finally, 
they showed that the participants’ perceived the first impression information as being 
positive, neutral, and negative at the appropriate times.   
As noted in the introduction, within the eyewitness literature, there is speculation 
that familiarity in identifications do cause errors related to accuracy in target-absent line-
up, but improvement in target-present line-ups (Collishaw, & Hole, 2000; Kerstholt, et al, 
1992; Read, 1995; Read, et al, 1990). When giving information to the individual, we 
hypothesized that first impression information would influence accuracy in target-absent 
line-ups. Specifically, I hypothesized that participants who were familiar with the target 
would have better accuracy in target-absent line-ups when receiving positive information. 
Similarly, I hypothesized that individuals receiving negative information would be less 
accurate in target-absent line-ups.  
A logistic regression was run and found that familiar group did have better correct 
rejection rates, but when comparing the first impression information conditions, it was 
found that no specific condition was significantly different. When looking at the 
percentage means, the neutral conditions (control) have no significant difference from 
each other. They both have an accuracy percentage of 59%. When participants are given 
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information about the target, the accuracy percentages are in the 70th percentile ranges. 
This shows why there is no significant difference between the first impression 
information, because when participants receive information in general there is an increase 
in accuracy. This is only the case for the familiar group. When the participants are 
unfamiliar to the target, their accuracy is average, and for the positive condition, below 
average. It can also be shown here more clearly that the accuracy difference in the 
negative condition when comparing the familiar and unfamiliar groups is substantial. The 
hypotheses is partially supported. It should be noted that there is a substantial difference 
between the familiar and unfamiliar groups, as well as a substantial difference within the 
familiar group between the neutral condition and the first impression information. These 
findings are interesting, mostly because it shows that our first impressions are having an 
impact on correct rejections in target-absent situations where the eyewitness has had 
previous exposure to the target. This could also be explained by a phenomenon called the 
polarization effect, more specifically relevant to the positive information conditions. 
Several researchers have explained that people who hold strong prior beliefs before being 
exposed to new information may reinterpret the new information as support for their 
belief (Fiske & Taylor, 1991); or receiving ambiguous information will count as support 
of their prior belief and serve as evidence to their maintain attitude (Sherman, Judd & 
Park, 1989).  Also, individuals who are exposed to information that contradicts their 
current belief causes them to feel even stronger about their prior belief (Higgins & Bargh, 
1987).  This area of research could explain the polarization of both the negative and 
positive conditions.  
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This experiment also adds to the current existing first impression literature. In 
current literature on first impressions, Baker, et al (2013) suggests that first impressions, 
though resilient, can be swayed by additional information when that information is 
negative. The current experiment manipulated the idea of familiar and unfamiliar first 
impression situations and found that when the information was given to the participant 
first, results showed that the target was perceived as being less trustworthy and less 
competent if information suggesting a negative past was existent. This effect was not 
evident when the participant saw the individual before they were given the information, 
making them familiar to the eyewitness. There was no difference in judgments as a result 
of being exposed to additional information. This study suggests that simply encountering 
a person for a short time (even through a photo) can creates a resilient first impression of 
that individual. This finding also helped with the manipulations within the experiment, 
ensuring that there was a clear difference between the first impression information 
conditions. There are several implications that can be discussed in regards to these 
findings alone. First, in situations where someone is unfamiliar to an individual, the 
information that is given to them about this said person, can be detrimental to their first 
impression of the target. Second, it can be said that if a person is familiar with the 
individual, additional information about them will not waiver the initial first impression 
that they have about the target. Finally, asking someone their perceptions of trust, 
competence, and attractiveness of an individual may be a tool to assess whether or not 
someone’s accuracy in a target-absent line-up should be considered adequate.   
Confidence ratings have been a topic of consideration and discussion within the 
eyewitness literature (Kerstholt, et al., 1992; Read, et al., 1990). Due to the literature on 
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confidence and target-absent line-ups suggesting that higher confidence is linked to more 
errors (Kerstholt, et al., 1992; Read, 1995; Read, et al., 1990), it was hypothesized that 
participants in the familiar group would be more confident in their identifications 
compared to the unfamiliar group. It was also hypothesized that participants who chose a 
foil, their post confidence ratings would be significantly lower in the familiar group. It 
was found that there was confidence differences amongst the conditions, but not when it 
came to familiar and unfamiliar groups. This was a trend, but it was not significant. 
Where confidence shown significance was in accuracy. Participants who chose to identify 
a foil, had a significant drop in confidence in comparison to participants who chose to 
reject the line-up. There was an interaction when measuring confidence with accuracy, 
and familiarity where participants who were in the familiar group, who falsely identified 
scored lower in their post confidence ratings. Overall, there was a great response rate for 
accuracy in the familiar group, but the ones who were “choosers”, their confidence 
significantly fell after completing the identification. These findings do not support the 
confidence and familiarity phenomenon discussed in past literature, but this effect is 
trending. This could be impacted by the first impression information that is given, as this 
effect is also trending. Unfortunately, without a two-way interaction with familiarity, and 
first impression information when measuring confidence, it is difficult to assess why this 
finding is not significant. Where confidence is significantly less in the familiar groups in 
the post measures, where participants were inaccurate in their identifications, there is 
some support for the confidence and accuracy literature.   
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Unanswered Questions and Future Directions 
 As with any experiment, there are unanswered questions and opportunities for 
future research.  A larger sample size would have been ideal. There were several effects 
that were trending in a direction that suggested that additional power might have resulted 
in significant effect. Specifically, within the negative conditions where there was a 
substantial accuracy difference between the familiar and unfamiliar condition, showing 
that the effect was more than 2 times likely to happen within the negative condition, and 
yet was not significant11.   
A second issue that a reader might consider is the realism of the eyewitness 
situation. Eyewitnesses normally have contact with individuals they are identifying in a 
familiar situation, meaning that for this experiment, their exposure to the image is more 
of a mundane realism experimental manipulation. Also, eyewitnesses would have been 
exposed to multiple faces during their time at a diner; the wait staff, other customers, and 
also the friend they are at the diner with. This again would be a mundane experimental 
manipulation. Ideally, I would have liked to compare a target present lineup to these 
findings. Currently, we are unware that this familiarity accuracy phenomenon with first 
impression literature is not happening in target present lineups. This does not impact the 
current results per say, as these findings do add to the current eyewitness literature 
relevant to familiarity.  
Next Steps  
 There are several obvious directions to pursue with this research. First, it would 
be fruitful to conduct an experiment addressing the target present lineup conditions. 
                                                          
11 Unfortunately, I did not foresee this effect happening based on the previous literature in first 
impression information used in Baker, et al (2013) where the negative information and positive conditions 
differed.  
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Replication of the current findings, and an added target present condition will allow for 
these findings to be better supported. It can be assumed based on the previous familiarity 
eyewitness literature that the eyewitnesses in the target-present line-ups conditions will 
be able to identify their suspect correctly. Within such an experiment, there would also be 
an added first impression information condition where participants will receive more 
information about the target, but information will be a mix of positive and negative 
impressions. Here it is possible to see if information in general is helping with the 
accuracy finding, or if it is more complicated than this initial finding. It would also be 
interesting to see if the sequential lineup procedure is as successful as the simultaneous 
lineup was in this experiment. Using these manipulations, it can be tested if this effect 
happens within several different eyewitness procedures.  
 Another direction for future research would be to explore of this phenomenon 
would occur in other contexts. The next step in this experiment naturally would be to 
look at this experiment using different manipulations. Having people from different 
ethnicities identifying if there is a cross race effect within the familiarity situations. I 
would argue that this may not necessarily be related to a cross race effect, but potentially 
associated with a stereotype threat. Also, exposing people to different faces, having 
different exposure times, and asking people to make identifications days after could have 
an impact on the current findings.  
Finally, there is an opportunity with the three factors (exposure, first impression 
information, and judgments) to create a structural equation model (see figure 6). Based 
on the current findings from this experiment, a larger population may produce a 
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mediation with several factors. There are multiple models that could be tested for 
exploratory reasons with a confirmatory factor analysis, but the current diagram is only a 
hypothetical layout of potential relationships present within these factors and outcomes.  
 
Figure 6. Hypothetical relationships between several factors within the experiment. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this experiment was to determine if first impression information 
had an impact on accuracy in target-absent line-ups, when eyewitnesses were familiar to 
the target. Based on the findings in this experiment, it could be argued that this is very 
much the case. Participants in familiar information based conditions had a higher 
accuracy rate when they were making the identification, comparing to participants in 
unfamiliar conditions with the same information. There are substantial findings from this 
experiment which could be applied directly to an eyewitness identification procedure 
with work and replication. First, understanding if the eyewitness has any previous contact 
with a suspect could greatly impact the identification process in target-absent line-ups. 
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Where previous literature suggests that familiarity boosts confidence, and lowers 
accuracy; it would need to be assessed if this familiarity is based on actual information 
given to the eyewitness, or just physically seeing the suspect. Second, it would be 
valuable to ask the eyewitness what they know about this individual. As previously 
determined, the type of first impression that they have does not impact the accuracy 
outcomes, but if the Police understand that the eyewitness have some form of past 
knowledge about this familiar individual, this familiarity may improve their accuracy in a 
target-absent line-up. Finally, there may be some flexibility when it comes to confidence 
ratings, seeing a decline in a confidence rating, may allow investigators to assess 
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Appendix A. Demographics Questionnaire 
 
1. What is your Gender?   __________ 
2. What is your Age?  _______ 
3. How many people lived in your household when you lived at home?_______ 
4. What is your occupation?___________ 
5. Please state what your household income was when you were living in your guardians 
house. 
i. $20,000 or lower 
ii. $20,001 -$35,000 
iii. $35,001- $50,000 
iv. $50,001- $70,000 
v. $70,001- $90,000 
vi. $90,001 and above. 
6. What socioeconomic status do you consider yourself from? (Low, Middle, High) 
7. Where are you from? _______ 
8. What is your ethnicity?_______ 
9. How did you learn of this experiment? 
a. Sona System 
b. PowerPoint in Class 
c. Social Media 
d. Dr. Tanya Peckmann 
e. Other _____________ 
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Appendix B. Script 
FAMILIAR CONDITIONS 1-6. 
You and a friend are sitting in a diner when someone approaches your table. This 
individual is a stranger to you, but an acquaintance to your friend.   
*The targets image will be visible to the participant* 
Friend: Oh hey John, How are you? 
Stranger: I’m doing well, I’s been awhile! How are you doing? 
Friend: Great! It was nice seeing you! 
Stranger: You too, have a good day. 
*Image of the stranger is removed* 
When the stranger has left, your friend leans in and tells you something… 
*Depending on the condition, this information will change* 
**Negative information option 1: “That was John. I went to high school 
with him. He basically failed every class he was ever in. As you can see, 
he did not amount to much. I am not sure what he does for a living, but I 
know that when we were in high school he used to sell drugs instead of 
getting a real job like the rest of us.” 
Neutral information Option 2: “That was John. I went to high school with 
him. I had a few classes together.” 
Positive information Option 3: “That was John. I went to high school with 
him. He was a straight A student. As you can see, he is pretty successful. I 
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am pretty sure he went to school for dentistry, but I know that when we 
were in high school he used to be on the yearbook committee and was 
involved in the community center.” ** 
UNFAMILIAR CONDITIONS 7-12  
(opening is different)  
You and a friend are sitting in a diner when your friend brings up a recent 
encounter they had with an old school mate.  
*Depending on the condition, this information will change* 
**Negative information option 1: “So I recently ran into a guy I went to 
high school with, John. He basically failed every class he was ever in. 
From what I could see, he did not amount to much. . I am not sure what he 
does for a living, but I know that when we were in high school he used to 
sell drugs instead of getting a real job like the rest of us.” 
Neutral information Option 2: “So I recently ran into a guy I went to high 
school with, John. We had a few classes together. I always find it 
interesting to see how other people are doing since high school.  
Positive information Option 3:“So I recently ran into a guy I went to high 
school with, John. He was a straight A student. From what I could  see, he 
is pretty successful. I am pretty sure he went to school for dentistry, but I 
know that when we were in high school he used to be on the yearbook 
committee and was involved in the community center. ** 
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Filler task instructions 
 
The waitress gives you the menu. 
You only have $20.00 
Goals: 
You must choose at least 3 items off the menu to create an appropriate dinner. (Ex. 
Appetizer, Main course, Drink.) 
(You can't just choose the sides, remember this must be a meal). 
Make sure to add the tax which is at 15% (For every $ you add .15). 
Do your best to stay under $20.00 
 
 
It is time to leave, you and your friend make your way to the exit in front  of the 
store. When you open the door you noticed something odd. 
**Ambiguous video plays** 
*Participants are asked to describe the individual in the video* 
*Participants will be asked to make judgments about the target in the 
video*  
A police officer approaches you shortly after, and asks you how confident you are 
 that you could identify this individual from an eyewitness line-up.  
*Rating of confidence* 
*Receive a target-absent lineup 
*Rating of post-confidence they made the right decision* 
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Appendix E. Judgment scales 
This person is trustworthy. 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Somewhat Disagree 
4. Neither Disagree or Agree 
5. Somewhat Agree 
6. Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
 
This person is competent.  
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Somewhat Disagree 
4. Neither Disagree or Agree 
5. Somewhat Agree 
6. Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
 
This person is attractive.  
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Somewhat Disagree 
4. Neither Disagree or Agree 
5. Somewhat Agree 
6. Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
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Appendix F. Confidence Measures 
 
Pre-Confidence 
1. How confident are you that you can identify the individual you saw running today? 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7 
Not at all  Neutral   Very confident 
 
Post-Confidence 




Not at all  Neutral   Very confident 
 
